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THE STATUTORY STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY:
THE NECESSITY FOR A RELATIVE STANDARD
DEPENDENT UPON FACTUAL INQUIRIES
The patent system in the United States is specifically authorized
by Article IV, section 8 of the Constitution which provides:
The Congress shall have Power .. .
To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
• • •
The congressional power to grant both patents and copyrights pur-
suant to this constitutional provision is limited, however, by the over-
riding purpose of the patent system as specifically stated in the con-
stitutional grant itself. Thus, the granting of exclusive rights in the
form of patents and copyrights must have as its ultimate purpose the
promotion of "the Progress of Science and Useful Arts." 2
The limited nature of this congressional power has restricted the
granting of patents to discoveries for which the grant of exclusive
rights will promote the progress of the art to which the discovery
pertains; that is, discoveries which in some way add to the knowledge
of the existing art. Conversely, "discoveries" of knowledge already
within the ken of those skilled in the art do not advance the progress
of the art and are, therefore, beyond the purview of the constitutional
grant and not patentable. Because of its fundamental importance to
the patent system, the issue of whether or not a particular discovery
does in some way add to the knowledge existing in the art has been
the subject of much litigation.
The basic statutory requirements for patentability were novelty
and utility; that is, a discovery had to be new and useful.° Added to
these requirements was the judicially created requirement of "inven-
tion." 4 Because the latter requirement did not utilize a standard which
could be analyzed in light of particular factual inquiries, the "inven-
tion" requirement led to considerable confusion among both com-
mentators and judges with respect to the actual criteria for patent-
ability .° In response to this situation, Congress enacted Section 103 of
the Patent Code.° This statute defines patentability in terms of the non-
obviousness of the subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the
art. This congressional response was intended to provide a standard
• U.S. Const. art. I, 4 8, cl. 8.
2 Id.
• Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
4 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
5 Goodman, The Effect of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 Upon the Patent
Laws, 35 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 233, 237 (1953). "Unfortunately there has not been uniformity
in the court interpretations, resulting in confusion and conflict."
O35 U.S.C. 4 103 (1964).
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directly related to the prevailing conditions in the art. Furthermore,
the establishment of the standard relative to which the determination
of non-obviousness of the subject matter was made, that is, the
person of ordinary skill in the art, was to be determined by an inquiry
into the surrounding factual circumstances.
The Supreme Court, in its first application of section 103, 7 ac-
knowledged this legislative purpose and directed that the standard
be established by making the appropriate factual inquiries.' Further-
more, the Court recognized that the conclusion of non-obviousness
could be reached by the use of secondary considerations, that is, by an
inquiry into factual conditions not directly related to the standard by
which non-obviousness must be determined, but conditions which
result if in fact the subject matter is non-obvious.° Such considera-
tions deemed relevant by the Court were long felt but unsolved need,
commercial success, failures of others, and recognition of the im-
portance of the discovery by others skilled in the art. Both the Court
and commentators expressed the hope that the determination of patent-
ability by means of such factual inquiries would remove the confusion
caused by the application of the "invention" requirement."
In its most recent application of section 103, however, the Court,
in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc.," ap-
plied a standard reminiscent of the invention requirement by disre-
garding both the requisite factual inquiries and the secondary factual
considerations indicating that the subject matter was in fact non-
obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art. Black Rock raises the
question of what is the correct standard by which obviousness is to
be determined. More specifically, is the standard to which the subject
matter must be non-obvious a totally relative one, or does it possess
a minimum level of competence which is ascertainable independently
of factual inquiries? The answer to this question can greatly influence
the determination of patent validity, especially in declaratory or sum-
mary judgment actions.
It will be the purpose of this comment to analyze the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in this area in search of an answer. In order
to provide the proper perspective, the historical background resulting
in the enactment of section 103, the statute itself and its judicial
predecessor will be examined. Finally, the Trilogy rationale and facts
will be discussed together with the Black Rock decision in order that
the two judicial approaches may be compared. In addition, the Black
Rock departure from the statutory standard will be considered in con-
stitutional terms.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 US. 1 (1966).
Id. at 17.
9 Id. at 17-18.
	 •
to Id.' at 18; CitinMent, The Impait of the Supreme Court Section 103 Cases on
theStazidard. of Patentability in the Lower Federal Courts, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 818,
827 (1967). •
11 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
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• I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.OF. SECTION 103 ..
The constitutional provision which provides for the establishment
of a patent system has been the subject of extensive analysis.' It is
widely recognized that as a matter of proper statutory interpretation's
this clause permits Congress to grant exclusory rights (patents) to
inventors for their discoveries, and analogous exclusory rights (copy-
rights) to authors for their writings." The purpose of these grants
must be to promote the progress of the useful arts in the case of
patents and science in the case of copyrights.
The nation's first patent law required that the subject matter be
"sufficiently useful and important" in order to be entitled to . a
patent's In 1793, the standard. was changed by Congress to require
that the subject matter be "new and useful."'s The latter requirements
of novelty and utility remained the principle statutory standards for
the next one hundred and fifty-nine years.
During the period in which the statutory standard was one of
novelty and utility the courts were involved in placing a significant
judicial gloss on the statutory requirements. In 1850, the Supreme
Court, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,' 8 added the requirement of "in-
vention" to the statutory standards of novelty and utility. The Court,
in Hotchkiss, required that the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented exhibit more ingenuity and skill than that of an ordinary
mechanic in the art.'s The rationale for this requirement may have
been that only "inventors" are entitled to patent grants and hence
only those "discoveries" which are the work of inventors, that is to
say, "inventions," are patentable. Alternatively, the "invention" re-
quirement may have been a constitutionally demanded definition of
the statutory requirement of novelty, since a "discovery" which em-
bodies nothing more than mechanical skill deprives those skilled in the
art of access to that which was previously available to them. Patentabil-
ity of such a "discovery" would not promote the progress of the useful
arts. Whichever rationale is accepted, the requirement of "invention"
became an established part of our patent law."
Application of this requirement created problems as the courts
attempted to ascertain what constituted this indefinite quality called
12 See Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393 (1960); Seidel,
The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 5 (1966) and
articles cited therein.
10 "The division of a balanced sentence was a rule of construction at common law.
Reddendo Singuio Sing:ills, meaning literally to refer each to each, as each phrase or
expression to its appropriate object." Seidel, supra nate 12, at 9 n.10.
14 See note 12 supra.
15 Act of April 10, 1790,'ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
16 Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
17 See Comment, The Standard of Patentability—Judicial Interpretation of Section
103 of the Patent Act, 63 Coluna. L. Rev. 306-07 (1963).
10 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
10 Id. at 266.
20 Federica} Commentary on the New Patent Act, :35 U.S.CA.• I, at 21-22 (1954).
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invention, and how much of it was necessary for patentability. The
problem was accentuated by the inability of the courts at times to
handle the highly technical aspects of what constitutes an inventive
contribution to a particular art. The result was the development of
"objective make weights" and negative rules of patentability," which
led to a wide diversity of judicial opinion." During the years im-
mediately preceding the enactment of section 103, the Supreme Court
appeared to apply an increasingly stricter test than that announced
in Hotchkiss.23
 For example, in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic
Devices Corp.," the Court stated that the subject matter must exhibit
a "flash of creative genius"" in order to possess the level of skill and
ingenuity necessary to constitute a patentable invention. In another
decision, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp. (A&P)," the Court expressed reservations about the proba-
bility of finding "invention" in a combination of old elements, and
required that the "whole in some way exceed[s] the sum of its
parts."27
 These decisions were the climax of a trend which sparked
such controversy and criticism28
 that Justice Jackson proclaimed,
"[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been
able to get its hands on."" It became apparent that "[t]he require-
ment for 'invention' was the plaything of judges who, as they became
initiated into its mysteries, delighted to devise and expound their own
ideas of what it meant; some very lovely prose resulting!" 80 It was in
response to these circumstances that section 103 was enacted.'
II. CONDITIONS FOR PATENTABILITY: NON-OBVIOUS SUBJECT
MATTER—SECTION 103 OF THE PATENT ACT
Section 103 provides:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences
between the subject matter sought be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
21 1 Patent Law Perspectives, 1969-70 Annual Review § A.1[1]-9.
22
 Federico, supra note 20, at 23.
23
 See Comment, supra note 17, at 307; Federico, supra note 20, at 22.
24 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
25 Id, at 91.
28 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
27 Id. at 152.
28
 See Balluff, Do Recent Supreme Court Opinions Raise the Standard of In-
vention, and Are Lower Courts Misinterpreting Such Opinions?, 34 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y
847 (1952); Weklind, No Valid Patents? U.S. Supreme Court Trends in Jungerson v.
Ostby & Barton Company, 31 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 859 (1949); Dodds & Crotty, The New
Doctrinal Trend, 30 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 83 (1948); Federico, supra note 12, at 22.
29 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton. Co., 335 U.S. 560 at 572 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
80 Rich, supra note 12, at 404.
al See Goodman, supra note 5.
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pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made."
This section was without any statutory predecessor and in general
embodied the "invention" requirement existing in the prior case law.
The stated purpose of the section was to provide a "stabilizing effect"
upon the diversity of judicial opinion created by the requirement of
"invention."" Following its enactment, section 103 was the center of
controversy concerning the effect of the new statutory standard upon
the judicial requirement of "invention."" Did section 103 revise the
stricter standard of Cuno and A&P, or merely codify existing, and
somewhat conflicting, case law? The legislative history is ambiguous
on this point and may be cited in support of either position." On the
whole, the stronger argument is that the section was intended as a
revision of the case law in effect at that time with a view toward re-
turning the invention requirement to the less stringent Hotchkiss
standard."
Whether revising or codifying the case law, the object of section
103 was to substitute uniformity for the confusion existing at the time
of its enactment." The Supreme Court recognized the validity of this
purpose in the Trilogy, and applied the statutory standard in order
that the desired uniformity might be achieved." In discussing the
effect of the statute upon the judicial requirement of invention, the
court characterized section 103 as a codification." This characteriza-
tion was made, however, only after the Court, in Graham v. John
Deere Co.," had interpreted Cuno as not establishing a higher standard
than that announced in Hotchkiss. The controversial "flash of genius"
in Cuno was explained as a "rhetorical embellishment" not varying
the Hotchkiss standard." The Court noted the similarity between the
Hotchkiss standard—more ingenuity and skill than the work of an
ordinarily skilled mechanic in the art, and the statutory language-
non-obviousness of the subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in
the art. Although the similarity of language is marked, the inquiries
82 35 U.S.C. 1 103 (1964).
38 Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before a Subcomm. of the House Com. on the Judiciary,
82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1951); Federico, supra note 12, at 20, 23.
84 See Beckett, Judicial Construction of the Patent Act of 1952—Codification v.
Substantive Change, 37 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 467 (1955) ; Marans, Some Aspects of the
Patent Act of 1952 as Interpreted by Published Decisions, 36 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 482,
490-98 (1954) ; Martin, The Patent Codification Act, 36 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 625, 632-37
(1954) ; Federico, supra note 20, at 22; Note, Section 103 of the Patent Act and the
Standard of Invention: Comments on Lyon v. Bausch & Lamb Optical Company, 44
Geo. L. J. 100 (1955).
35 See Comment, supra note 17, at 310.
36 Id. at 312; Federico, supra note 20, at 22-23.
87 383 U.S. at 15; Goodman, supra note 5, at 238.
53 383 U.S. at 17-19.
39 Id. at 17.
4° 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
41 Id. at 15 n.7.
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are essentially different: the Hotchkiss inquiry being directed toward
an assessment of the dependent standard of "invention," the section
103 inquiry being directed toward an ascertainment of the relative
standard of non-obviousness of the subject matter." The Court in
Graham applied the statutory standard and directed its inquiry toward
a determination of the issue of non-obviousness alone. Before dis-
cussing the application of section 103 in the Trilogy and Black Rock,
an analysis of the statutory standard itself, as well a comparison of
this standard with the judicial requirement of invention is necessary.
The invention requirement may be characterized as demanding
an objective test of patentability. The subjective achievement of the
inventor is immaterial; the subject matter must be evaluated with
reference to a standard by which the validity of every patent is ap-
praised." The establishment of the "invention" standard by which the
subject matter was evaluated involved a determination on the part of
the judge as to what did or did not constitute invention. Although
phrased in terms of the skill and ingenuity of a mechanic skilled in the
art, the establishment of the standard was made without the benefit
of factual inquiries into the existing skill and ingenuity of an ordinarily
skilled mechanic in the art in order to reflect the judge's hindsight-
ridden opinion of what constituted invention. Lest judgment be too
harsh, it should be, noted that in many instances the factual inquiries
into the level of skill of an ordinarily skilled mechanic in an art in-
volved highly technical considerations, the evaluation of which was
often beyond the judge's competence. Faced with the dilemma of being
required to make a choice, yet unable to comprehend fully the factual
considerations relevant to this - determination, the court made its
decision independently of the factual inquiries, but rather relied solely
upon an intuitive assessment of what constitutes "invention.' 44
In enacting section 103, Congress recognized that the determina-
tion of patentability, with reference to a standard ascertained inde-
pendently of factual inquiries, was the major cause of the judicial
confusion and lack of uniformity on the question of the standard
required for patentability." Section 103 replaced the invention require-
ment with a requirement of non-obviousness. The statutory test is
objective, as is the "invention" test." The question is not whether the
subject matter was obvious to the patent applicant, but whether the
subject matter was non-obvious by evaluation with respect to the
standard by which every patent is appraised. The statutory standard,
unlike the independent standard used in the "invention" test, is a
42 Id. at 14.
48 Federico, supra note 20, at 21.
44 See Rich, supra note 12; Goodman, supra . note S ; Note, Subtests of "Non-
obviousness": A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 Fa: L. Rev. 1169-170
(1964).
• - " " "46 Federico, supra note 20, at 20-23.
40 Id. at 21.
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relative. one'? The subject matter need• not be non-obvious per se,
but rather non-obvious to a perion of ordinary skill in the art. Thus,
in applying section 103, the determination of . obviousness is depen-
dent upon factual inquiries establishing the status of the standard."
The capabilities and prejudices of one of ordinary skill in the art must
be ascertained in order that obviousness may be determined relative
to this standard and in light of these capabilities and prejudices." At
this juncture it may be noted that the imposition of a minimum level
of skill, ascertained independently of factual inquiries, upon one of
ordinary skill in the art, presents the same problem as the determina-
tion of the requirement of "invention" independently of factual in-
quiries. The problem is less serious in that it occurs only when the
minimum level of competence is at issue. However, the very existence
of this minimum affords the courts an opportunity to reach the con-
clusion of obviousness without factual inquiry by independently estab-
lishing the minimum level of competence in such a manner as to
support the conclusion of obviousness in terms of the statutory re-
quirement by the subterfuge of a minimum level of skill. Needless to
say, this practice would lead to a lack of uniformity in the decisions
and a divergence of judicial opinion: the specific conditions section 103
was enacted to avoid.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 103
A. Lower Courts
Those courts adhering to the statutory requirement have demon-
strated that obviousness is determined by application of a relative
standard.
Obviousness .is a legal conclusion which we are required
to draw from faCts. . . Thus before we can conclude that
any disclosed invention is "obvious" under the conditions
specified in 35 U.S.C. § 103, we must evaluate facts from
. which to determine 1) what was shown in the prior art at
the time the invention was made, and 2) the knowledge
which a person of. ordinary skill in the.art possessed at the
time the invention was made. . . . We are unwilling to substi-
tute speculation and hindsight appraisal of the prior art for
such factual data. (Emphasis added.) 5°
Moreover, it is recognized that the standard is specifically relative, that
is, obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Faced with the contention
that .a combination herbicide would have been obvious to an ordinary
47 The standard is related to existent conditions which are determinative of the
status of the standard.
ss See text at notes 50, 52 supra; see also Application of Lettvin, 339 F.2d 249
(C.C.P.A. 1964).
49 See text at notes 53, 55 supra.
so Application of Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 690. (C.C.PA, 1962).
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farmer• presented with a specific prior art patent, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals stated:
It is our view that what would be obvious to the "ordi-
nary farmer" has no bearing on the issue before us. Section
103 requires that determinations of obviousness be made with
respect to a person of a particular skill, namely, a person of
ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains
as of the time the invention was made. The statute does not
contemplate degrees of skill and, accordingly, evidence of
obviousness to those not of ordinary skill is not controlling. 52
The prior art must be considered as a whole. Specific references
cannot be extracted from their context in order to support a conclusion
of obviousness because such isolation does not provide the background
"necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly sug-
gests to one of ordinary skill in the art." 53
 The prior art may "conceal"
an otherwise obvious solution from those in the art. The failures of
others in the art due to apparently inherent and insurmountable dis-
advantages of an approach may teach away from solution by this
means. The knowledge of such teaching by one of ordinary skill in
the art creates a predisposition against solution of the problem by the
disproven and unsatisfactory approach. This knowledge and predis-
position must be considered in determining obviousness under section
103." Thus, it has been stated: "No evaluation of an invention can
ignore the known technology of record and the direction indicated
thereby.'
B. The Trilogy
The Supreme Court's first interpretation of section 103 came in
the Trilogy." The Court recognized that the use of "invention" as a
label was the cause of the lack of uniformity in the decisions of the
courts and the variety of opinion on the subject.57
 Aware of the fact
that the section was added by Congress to insure "uniformity and
definiteness,"" the Court espoused "strict observance" of the require-
51
 "The ordinary farmer is clearly one of less than ordinary skill in the herbicide
art." Application of Luvisi, 342 F.2d 102, 108 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
52 Id. at 108.
53
 Application of Wesslau, 353 F.2d 238, 244 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
84 See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1965) ; accord, Technical Tape
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 143 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 247
F.2d 343, mandate recalled on other grounds, 249 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied
355 U.S. 952 (1958). "That a person having ordinary skill in the art would "know better"
than to attempt it does not negative patentability." 143 F. Supp. at 433.
55
 Application of Sukman, 351 F.2d 658, 660 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
58 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ; Calmar, Inc. & Colgate-
Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ; United States v. Adams, 383 U.S.
39 (1966).
57 383 U.S. at 12.
55 Id. at 15.
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ments set down in Graham so as to bring about "that uniformity and
definiteness which Congress called for in the 1952 Act."" The section
103 requirement of non-obviousness is a "more practical test of patent-
ability"" than the judicially established "invention" requirement. The
Court stated that the section
lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103,
the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are
to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the perti-
nent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved need, failure of others, etc., might be utilized
to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin
of the subject matter sought to be patented."
The Court called for determination of these factual inquiries in estab-
lishing a relative standard by which obviousness is appraised in order
that the congressionally desired uniformity would be achieved."
Graham v. John Deere Co., 68 involved a combination of elements
old in the art to provide for the flexing of a plow shank when obstruc-
tions beneath the plowed surface were struck." The difference be-
tween the prior art and the patented device was a slight structural
change, the inversion of two members of one of Graham's previously
patented devices." The requirement of non-obviousness became de-
terminative of patentability. In holding that the subject matter was
not patentable, the Court concluded that it was obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art to invert the elements of the prior art in the
patented manner in order to achieve the desired result."
The claimed "invention" of inverting two elements of a prior
Graham device, the hinge plate and the shank, was specifically rejected
by the patent examiner as "matters of design well within the expected
skill of the art and devoid of invention."' The applicant also stressed
the reduced wear characteristic of the inverted arrangement over the
prior art. No mention was made before the patent office of a flexing
quality." It was this flexing quality alone which was argued before the
courts as the non-obvious result upon which patentability should be
predicated."
69 Id. at 18.
00 Id. at 17.
01 Id. at 17-18.
02 Id. at 18.
03 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
64 U.S. Patent No. 2,627,798 (hereinafter referred to as Graham '798).
65 U.S. Patent No. 2,493,811.
66 383 U.S. at 25.
07 Id. at 22-23.
68 Id. at 23.
09 Id.
925
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The patent examiner's allowance of the patent on the basis of the
reduced wear characteristic as providing the non-obvious aspect of the
inverted structure was made without the benefit of the Glencoe pa-
tent." The latter patent reveals the same elements in identical func-
tional relationship. In light of Glencoe's teaching, Graham's inversions
of elements to achieve reduced wear was not a non-obvious difference.
In other words, the stirrup in Glencoe serves exactly the
same function as the heel of the hinge plate in '798. The
mere shifting of the wear point to the heel of the '798 hinge
plate from the stirrup of Glencoe—itself a part of the hinge
plate—presents no operative mechanical distinctions, much
less non obvious differences."
It was also claimed that the inversions of the hinge plate and
shank permit the shank to flex away from the hinge plate instead of
being restrained by pressing against it. This flex was claimed to be
responsible for absorbtion of the tremendous forces exerted upon the
shank when the plow strikes an object beneath the surface, and was
asserted to be non-obvious under section 103. 72 The Court skeptically
viewed the argument as an afterthought." Flexing was not a claim of
the patent. Graham's experts did not consider the flexing advantages
to be a significant feature." The Court reasoned:
If free-flexing, as petitioners now argue, is the crucial
difference above the prior art, then it appears evident that
the desired result would be obtainable by not boxing the
shank within the confines of the hinge. . . . The only other
effective place available in the arrangement was to attach it
below the hinge plate and run it through a stirrup or bracket
that would not disturb its flexing qualities. Certainly a
person having ordinary skill in the prior art, given the fact
that the flex in the shank could be utilized more effectively if
allowed to run the entire length of the shank, would im-
mediately see that the thing to do was what Graham did,
i.e., invert the shank and the hinge plate."
The subtests of non-obviousness" were not urged in support of
patentability. It is likely that the failure of Graham to incorporate the
flexing feature into its commercial products was indicative of lack of
70 Id. at 22. The Glencoe patented structure is a clamp device in which all of the
elements of the Graham '798 device are found in the identical mechanically operative
relationship to one another.
71 Id. at 26.
72 Id. at 23-24.
78 Id. at 25.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 24, 25.
76
 See text at note 9 supra.
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utility in the feature, as well as indicative of the Court's view that the
difference was merely a design change and not a non-obvious difference.
It is notable that in affirming the decision of the court of appeals
in Graham, the Supreme Court rejected as erroneous the lower court's
holding of invalidity based upon the lack of a new result produced
by the combination." The Supreme Court's finding of invalidity was
based solely upon the obviousness of the result.
In the companion case of Calmer, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co.,"
the device in controversy was a hold-down cap which protected the
finger-operated pump of an insecticide spray bottle during shipment."
The device provided the convenience of installing the cap and pump in
a single operation.s° All of the elements of the cap had been disclosed
in the prior art." In order to distinguish the cap from the prior art the
claims were limited by the examiner to a space between the top of the
container and the bottom of the screw-on protective cap, and the use
of a rib rather than a gasket to form a seal to prevent leakage."
The space between the top of the container and the bottom of the
protective cap was a design peculiarity demanded in order that the
cap could screw on tightly to form the desired seal. The prior art dis-
closed a space performing the identical function. Thus, the space was
not patentable independently of the rib-seal feature." The use of a
rib instead of a gasket was disclosed in the references of an analogous
art." The Livingstone patents' related to liquid containers having
pouring spouts rather than spray pumps. The problems faced in both
fields, however, are similar so that the art in question is properly that
of closure, embracing applications to both types of containers. The
closure devices, as applied to containers having pouring spouts, were
at least pertinent references." On this basis, the Court concluded that
the use of the rib in the particular combination was an obvious applica-
tion." Although the subtests of long felt need, unsuccessful attempts
of others to solve the problem, and commercial success were urged as
proof of non-obviousness, the Court recognized that the issuance of
the Livingstone patent rendered prior need and failures immaterial."
The Court's analysis followed the requirements set out in Graham.
In determining the scope and content of the prior art, the art was
properly defined as that of closure devices. The application of pro-
77 383 U.S. at 4.
78
 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
7° Id. at 26.
80
 Id. at 29.
81 Id.
82
 Id. at 33.
88 Id. at 34-35.
84 Id. at 31 n.17.
88 Id. at 31. U.S. Patent No. 2,715,480. A bold-down cap for use on liquid containers
possessing pouring spouts.
80
 383 U.S. at 35.
87
 Id. at 37.
88 Id. at 36.
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tective caps to containers with pouring spouts is analogous to the ap-
plication of protective caps to containers with spray pumps. In deter-
mining the level of ordinary skill in the art, the Court presumed that
one of ordinary skill in the art would possess the ability to apply
correctly the teaching of Livingstone to the problem faced in the use of
a protective cap on a container with a spray pump. Absent any rebuttal
evidence such presumption is valid. The analysis demonstrates that
the factual inquiries required in Graham are separate and distinct. The
scope and content of the prior art is determined relative to what was
published or patented. Although some in the art may not have had
knowledge of a particular reference, it is clear that others, the patentee
or author of the reference, did have such knowledge. The question thus
becomes whether a person of ordinary skill in the art presented with
the prior art references and the problem at hand would find the solu-
tion obvious. The skill of this person, his ability to utilize the references
if presented with them in solution of the problem, is determinative.
The Court impliedly presumed reasonable mechanical skill in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary." In other words, the presumed level
of skill is identical with, or perhaps lower than, the existing level of
skill in the art. Thus, the relative nature of the obviousness standard
is not violated.
In United States v. Adams," The Court's analysis of the obvious-
ness of the result became more apparent. The patented device was a
non-rechargeable water-activated battery comprised of a magnesium
anode and a cuprous chloride cathode!". The government argued for
invalidity on the basis of structural obviousness:
[W]et batteries comprising a zinc anode and silver chloride
cathode are old in the art. . • . The prior art shows that mag-
nesium may be substituted for zinc and corpus chloride for
silver chloride. Hence . . . the "combination of magnesium
and cuprous chloride in the Adams battery was not patentable
because it represented either no change or an insignificant
change as compared to prior battery designs?'"
The issue of novelty was disposed of by the fact that the Adams bat-
tery was water activated, that of the prior art was not." A foreign
patent cited by the government as anticipatory was found to be both
dangerous and inoperable, and for these reasons did not negative
novelty." The Court directed its inquiry toward determination of the
issue of obviousness.
The Adams battery revealed startling new properties which one
skilled in the prior art would not expect to obtain from the combina-
80 Id. at 36, 37.
90 383 U.S. 1, 39 (1966).
91 Id. at 42.
92 Id. at 48.
83 Id.
94 Id. at 50.
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tion of magnesium and cuprous chloride as electrodes. The Court
reasoned that one skilled in the prior art seeking a battery with the
properties of the Adams battery would not have found it obvious to
use magnesium and cuprous chloride electrodes to achieve these prop-
erties." To do so would require one to ignore the teachings of the prior
art which would "deter any investigation into such a combination as
. . . used by Adams."" Thus, "known disadvantages in old devices
which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions may
be taken into account in determining obviousness." 87 In addition, the
subtests of non-obviousness in Adams significantly bolstered the Court's
conclusion of non-obviousness."
By way of dicta, the Court stated that one does not necessarily
discover a patentable innovation "by shutting his eyes to their prior
disadvantages."" Although this statement may be interpreted as im-
plying some kind of non-statutory limitation on patentability, the
context in which it appears argues for a contrary interpretation. The
person making such a discovery must overcome the prior art in meeting
the statutory requirements, especially that of novelty.'" The Court
also spoke in terms of one of "reasonable" skill in the art in determin-
ing the obviousness of the three devices.' However, no indication was
made to what distinguished one reasonably skilled from one ordinarily
skilled; nor did the facts demand such a distinction. It would appear
that the Court's factual inquiries, especially in Adams, establishing the
level of skill in the art, would imply that reasonably skilled and ordi-
narily skilled are synonymous, and that both are related to the teach-
ings of the prior art. Nevertheless, the use of this language is regretta-
ble because of its potential for misinterpretation and misapplication
of the statutory standard.
C. Anderson's-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage 102
Black Rock presented problems not encountered in the Trilogy.
The presumption of the level of skill in the art made in the Graham
and Cook Chemicalm cases, if made in Black Rock, would have been
rebutted by factual evidence of the level of skill of one of ordinary skill
in the art. The issue is raised whether the lower level of skill in the
art as factually ascertained, prevails over the presumed but higher
05 Id. at 51.
96 Id. at 52.
97 Id.
88 Id.
99 Id.
100 "As we have seen in Graham . . . novelty and nonobviousness—as well as
utility—are separate tests of patentability and all must be satisfied in a valid patent."
383 U.S. at 48.
101 383 U.S. at 37, 52.
102 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
103 The presumption being that one of ordinary skill in the art possessed reasonable
mechanical design ability, as in Graham, and the skill to appreciate and apply the' prior
art to the analogous problem in Cook Chemical.
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minimum level of skill ascertained independently of factual inquiries.
If the statutory standard is to achieve its stated purpose of bringing
about uniformity in the determination of patentability, it has been
shown that a purely relative standard is necessary, in which case the
former level of skill must prevail.'" Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
impliedly chose the independently ascertained level over the factually
dependent level.'" -
The patented device in Black Rock was a machine for use in
bituminous paving.'" The bituminous pavement art had long been
plagued by the formation of a "cold joint." In practice, several
adjacent strips of pavement would have to be laid. However, the
first strip would have cooled by the time the paver returned to lay an
adjacent strip. The cooled and hardened edge of the first strip would
not form a bond with the new pavement, causing a cold joint to result.
The joint permitted the seepage of water and dirt between the strips
causing ravelling and accelerated deterioration of the pavement.'"
Those skilled in the art had sought a solution to the problem
through the use of heat to soften the edge of the first strip so that a
bond could be formed. The use of an open flame was found to be in-
effective. Indeed the high temperature carbonized the edge thus ag-
gravating the problem. Radiant heaters were also found to be ineffec-
tive, being incapable of producing the penetrative heat necessary to
melt the edge to a depth sufficient to form a stable bond. Although
radiant heaters were used for limited patching operations, those skilled
in the art abandoned the use of heat as a solution to the cold joint
problem, concluding that the heat required for deep penetration could
not be obtained without the deleterious effects of carbonizing . 1°8 A
costly and time-consuming procedure was adopted to minimize, but not
eliminate, the effects of the cold joint. The edge was cut back several
inches to form a smooth vertical surface. This was "painted" with hot
asphalt and the adjacent strip was laid. The inventor, Neville, at-
tempted to solve the cold joint problem by use of an improved radiant
heater. He incorporated the heater along with the elements of a stan-
dard paver into a single unit which laid the adjacent strip and removed
the cold joint in a single step.
The radiant heater used was not itself patentable.'" The use of
104 See text at note 47 supra.
108 The Court's conclusion In terms of section 103 obviousness despite factual evi-
dence of non-obviousness indicates that the evidence was not conclusive in establishing
the status of the statutory standard. Thus the skill of one of ordinary skill in the art,
on the basis of which obviousness was predicated, was ascertainable independently of
the evidence indicating a lower level of skill to which the device was non-obvious. 383
U.S. at 62.
100 396 U.S. at 57.
107 Id. at 57, 58.
100 Pavement Salvage Co., Inc. v. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc., 404 F.2d 450, 451
`.(4th Cir. 1968).
109 The heater used was almost identical with that disclosed by Swank in U.S.
Patent No. 2,775,294. 396 U.S. at 58.
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the heater in working asphalt was not patentable for lack of novelty."'
The question presented was "whether the combination of the old
elements created a valid combination patent."'" The Court con-
cluded "that the combination was reasonably obvious to one with
ordinary skill in the art." 112 Clearly the combination fulfilled the re-
quirements of novelty and utility, 1  and section 103 should have been
determinative of the patent validity.
In support of non-obviousness, testimony of experts in the field
was offered. They not only found that the solution was non-obvious,
but they refused to believe Neville's claims that he had achieved the
solution by use of a radiant beater.' The subtests of non-obviousness
were also advanced in support of non-obviousness."' The combination
fulfilled a long felt need, achieved commercial success, was recognized
by others in the art as a great advance, and overcame the repeated
failures of those in the art to solve the problem."' The Supreme Court
did not find this evidence controlling.
Initially, the Court advanced the requirement for a "synergistic
result."'" This non-statutory requirement may be best understood in
light of the Court's statement that "while the combination of old ele-
ments performed a useful function . . . it added nothing to the nature
and quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented."'" (Emphasis
added.) This conclusion was reached despite the Trilogy's express
disapproval of the requirement for a new result in favor of an analysis
of the obviousness of the result."'
In effect, the Court stated that the unpatentable heater could not
be merely incorporated with functiOnally independent elements to
form a patentable combination. The effect produced was not that of
the combination per se, but merely the sum of the effects of the inde-
pendent elements.'" As such, this rationale is a definition of patentable
combination. The question is whether this definition is justifiable.
Although the rationale is appealingly consistent, the statutory
requirements in terms of which patentability must be determined are
novelty, utility and non-obviousness of the subject matter."' Com-
binations come within the section 101 definition of patentable arti-
110 Prior art, U.S. Patent No. 1,136,294; U.S. Patent No. 2,053,709; British Patent
No. 756,911 disclosed the use of heat in working asphalt. 404 F.2d at 451.
111 396 U.S. at 59.
112 Id. at 60.
112 The "combination" itself was novel although use of a radiant heater was not.
The "combination" was also useful.
114 404 F.2d at 453; 396 U.S. at 59.
115 396 U.S. at 61.
116 404 F.2d at 454.
117 396 U.S. at 61.
118 Id. at 62.
119 See note 77 supra.
120 396 U.S. at 60.
121 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq. (1964).
931•
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
cies."' Furthermore, section 112 deals explicitly with combinations.
The device in question was within the definition of section 100 and
met the requirements of section 101 and section 102. Therefore, the
sole requirement remaining for determination was that of section 103,
non-obviousness of the subject matter.
It is notable that in the vast majority of cases the combination
which produces solely the sum of the effects of the independent ele-
ments will be obvious under section 103. The combination which
produces an effect which differs from the anticipated sum of the effects
of the independent elements, a synergistic result, is non-obvious. While
a synergistic result is always indicative of non-obviousness, it is asserted
that the converse does not follow; that is, that a non-synergistic result
is always indicative of obviousness under section 103 does not follow.
The device itself may reveal the principles upon which its success
depends and in this manner demonstrate the previously unappreciated
effect of one or more of the elements. In other words, the disadvantages
existing in the prior art are assumed to exist in the element incorpo-
rated, but upon combination it is discovered that this assumption was
clearly erroneous. Thus, the result achieved is the obvious result which
would be anticipated to occur from the combination of the elements.
This conclusion disregards the invalidating effect of the use of hind-
sight, as well as the fact that the choice to combine these elements may
itself have been non-obvious."' In Black Rock, given the characteris-
tics of the heater along with the other elements of the combination, the
result will be obvious. However, to those in the art, it would not be
obvious to choose this heater, or look to its specifications, in light of
the apparently conclusive nature of the failures of those who had
attempted to use heat as a solution to the cold joint problem. Only
after the fact did the crucial manner in which this beater differed from
prior art become apparent, and only the success of this combination
revealed the cause for the failures in the prior art. Thus, the require-
122 Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 17 (1954) ex-
plaining the definition of the word "process" in 35 U.S.C.	 100(b) (1964) as used in
35 U.S.C.	 101 (1964).
123 See, e.g., Application of Gray, 230 F.2d 432 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Marvel Specialty
Co., Inc. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. N.C. 1963), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 330 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1964); Application of Irmscher,
262 F.2d 85, 87 (C.C.P.A. 1958), where the court stated that "the mere fact that the
individual steps are taught by the several references does not of itself negative patent-
ability .... It must still be determind whether the combination of steps would have been
obvious to an ordinary skilled worker in this art." (Emphasis added.); See also Appli-
cation of Pennington, 241 F.2d 750, 754 (C.C.P.A. 1957), where the court stated:
We are not unmindful of the fact that it might be said that the modifications
of appellant over the prior art apparatus do not produce what would normally
be termed "new and unexpected results." We are of the opinion, however,
that this consideration is not the determinant here, for it is well recognized that
in many cases invention may consist in one or both of two steps: 1)the concep-
tion of the general result wished for; 2) the actual means of achieving that
result.
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ment of a synergistic result for patentability of a combination is
erroneous in terms of the statutory' standards.
The Court apparently recognized the fallacy in requiring a syner-
gistic result of all patentable combinations and determined patent-
ability in terms of obviousness. It was concluded that "to those skilled
in the art the use of the old elements in combination was not an inven-
tion by the obvious-nonobvious standard." 124 This conclusion neces-
sarily disregards the direct evidence of non-obviousness and the indicia
of non-obviousness presented by the subtests, and leads to the inescap-
able implication of some minimum level of skill required of one of
ordinary skill in the art.'" The level of skill with reference to which
the Supreme Court made its determination of obviousness was not the
purely relative standard demanded by section 103. It is suggested that
this departure from a purely relative standard is not justifiable on the
basis of statutory construction, constitutional requirements or public
policy.
IV. JUSTIFIABILITY OF THE BLACK ROCK DEPARTURE FROM THE
SECTION 103 STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY
The judicial interpretation of section 103 has indicated the purely
relative nature of the standard. 12° Furthermore, the language of the
section is not given to a non-relative construction. "Ordinary skill in
an art" is defined as " [t] hat degree of skill which men engaged in that
particular art usually employ; not that which belongs to a few men
only, of extraordinary endownments and capacities."127 "Person" is
defined as "[a] man considered according to the rank he holds in
society, with all the right to which the place he holds entitles him, and
the duties which it imposes." 128
 The combination of these definitions
yields a purely relative standard. The definition of obviousness rein-
forces the conclusion that no minimum competence ascertained inde-
pendently of factual inquiries is contemplated by the language of
section 103.128
124 396 U.S. at 62, 63.
125 See note 105 supra.
126 See pp. 923-24 supra and text at note 123.
127 Black's Law Dictionary 1250 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
128 Id. at 1299.
129 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1963) defines "obvious" as:
Capable of easy perception ... requiring'very little insight or reflection to per-
ceive, recognize, or comprehend . . . requiring no thought or consideration to
understand or analyze . . . so simple and clear as to be unmistakable . • .
disappointingly simple and easy to discover or interpret . .. wanting in any
challenging or interesting complexity or ingenuity (Emphasis added.)
Note that (1) what is "obvious" as so defined to a person is dependent upon his knowl-
edge and perceptive ability and (2) some principle may be discernible by the use of
reason, reflection or after consideration and yet not be obvious. If consideration or use
of reason is necessary to overcome a predisposition of an individual, the solution to a
problem is not obvious to that individual although it may be obvious to one not so
predisposed.
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Although not justifiable in terms of statutory construction alone,
is the imposition of the independent minimum standard constitutionally
required and therefore justified? As indicated, the sole constitutional
requirement is that the section be enacted "to promote the Progress of
. . . the Useful Arts.""° The argument has been made that a device
need not be better than the prior art in order to be patentable since the
progress of the useful arts may be promoted by enrichment as well as
by addition."' A new way of doing something which is no better a
means than that disclosed in the prior art, may nevertheless inspire a
solution to a problem in another art , by providing new avenues for
those in that art.'" The progress of other useful arts is not hindered
in any additional degree since the new device may prove more ad-
vantageous in certain applications due to reduced cost or other factors
not directly related to the efficiency with which it performs. Similarly,
a contribution, non-obvious to one of ordinary skill in an art, promotes
the progress of that art by enrichment as well as addition. Moreover,
the progress of other arts is not hindered by the patent grant since the
patentee has disclosed a method or device previously unavailable be-
cause those not skilled in the art had relegated developments to those
skilled in the art. Although the solution would have been obvious to
one not skilled in the art, the fact remains that solution was not offered
by those outside the art although their arts may have suffered by lack
of the solution. The disclosure of the solution directly benefits these
arts. The conclusion must be that a purely relative standard fulfills the
constitutional requirement and a minimum non-relative standard is
not demanded.'"
The final grounds for justification must be that of policy. It has
been shown that the express policy behind the enactment of section
103 was to correct the conditions of confusion and lack of uniformity
created by the determination of patentability independently of factual
inquiries via the judicially established invention requirement. 134 This
legislative policy will be substantially defeated by imposition of an
independent minimum upon the otherwise purely relative statutory
standard.13" The sole justification for defeating the policy of this
specific section must have been a determination that full implementa-
tion of this section to effectuate its policy would conflict with an
overriding policy of the statute as a whole. This practice should be
resorted to only when the policies cannot be otherwise reconciled and
130 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
01 See, Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 400 (1960),
where the author states: "[w]henever novel subject matter, unobvious to the workers
of ordinary skill in an art, is published, progress in the art is promoted."
182 Id.
233 Cf. Rich, supra note 131, where the author demonstrates the lack of necessity
for a non-statutory requirement that the device be better than the prior art in order to
promote the progress of the useful arts—a requirement employing a nonrelative standard.
184 See M. 920-23 supra.183 See p. 923 supra.
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are mutually exclusive. In this area, the overriding public policy is
generally phrased as a requirement of some meritorious contribution
which is sufficient to permit the "embarrassment" of a private right on
the public domain."' Several objections may be made to justifying the
imposition of an independent minimum upon the purely relative statu-
tory standard on the basis of this policy argument.
It may be asserted that the proper arbiter of public policy is the
legislature. Hence, when faced with a conflict the specific policy controls
the general policy since the legislature would not pursue the conflicting
policy unless it determined that the exception to the general policy was
significant enough to warrant itself. Furthermore, it may be claimed
that the overriding public policy is solely the policy expressed in the
Constitution. Any policy abstracted from the patent laws as a whole
is limited by this constitutional policy. Thus, such an abstracted policy
should not be effectuated to defeat the specific policy of section 103
which is in concert with the constitutional policy of promoting the
progress of the useful arts. Arguably, the construction given section
103 detracts from the incentive provided inventors to invent and to
disclose their discoveries in return for patent protection. Since it is
the disclosure as well as the incentive to invent which promotes the
progress of the useful arts, a construction which lessens this incentive
thwarts the constitutional policy and cannot be justified on social or
other non-constitutional grounds. 137 Finally, if the overriding policy is
considered as an amplification or interpretation of the constitutionally
expressed policy, nevertheless the specific policy of section 103 should
be effectuated since no conflict exists. The whole of our national en-
deavor benefited directly from the disclosure of the device used in
Black Rock. There is no indication that the solution would have been
forthcoming from another source. Thus, the disclosure which was made
and the subsequent manufacture of the devices under patent protection
led to widespread improvement of the nation's highways. Lower costs
resulted in the reallocation of tax revenues to more advantageous pur-
poses. The safety of all motorists was, increased by removal of the joint
and by the lessening of the dangers inherent in a cracked, potholed or
uneven road surface. These benefits were derived from the incentive
to disclose the device offered by the patent system, as well as the
incentive to invest resulting from the protection afforded the patented
device. The manufacture and distribution of an expensive piece of
machinery, such as the paver in question, requires a large initial invest-
ment of capital. If the machinery is not produced, the public does not
benefit; but without capital there is no production. Without incentive
to invest, the capital will not be forthcoming. Furthermore, just as
investors are unwilling to invest 'without protection and assurance of
136 383 U.S. at 10, II.	 •
137 See Rich, supra note 131, at 402 where the author • concludes: "True, they are
temporary monopolies, but therein alone lies their power as Inducements to invent, to
disclose, to invest, and to design around."
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a return on their money, so also the inventor is without incentive to
disclose his discovery or to produce the machine on his own since his
idea will be stolen. Rather, he will rely upon secrecy and offer his
services, but not the machine itself, for sale.'" The useful arts are not
promoted in this event. It should be remembered that the monopoly of
which the courts speak with restrained dislike, is given by the govern-
ment in exchange for disclosure by the inventor. It was his right to
keep the knowledge secret and to deprive the public of its benefits.
He gave up that right in return for another, his patent rights. Thus,
the result in Black Rock of imposing an independent minimum upon
the statutory standard is not justifiable. The Supreme Court should
disavow the Black Rock rationale and return to the Trilogy standard
in its determination of patentability.
Besides the deleterious effect of Black Rock upon the prospects
of achieving uniformity, the rationale of the case detrimentally affects
patent litigation.
[A]n artificial decrease in the cost of litigation at the price
of having valid patents summarily held invalid for want of
proper trials where objective evidence of non-obviousness
could be presented is not tolerable under the statute. It is
not only antithetical to the best interests of industry, science,
and the useful arts in the United States but will not serve any
other identifiable social interest.'"
CONCLUSION
"Justice Holmes said that the life of the law has not been logic
but experience. In Black Rock, the Supreme Court has defied both." 14a
This decision has returned the determination of patentability to the
confusion which preceded the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952.
By imposing a minimum level of skill upon the statutory standard, a
minimum determined independently of factual inquires, Black Rock
departed from a purely relative standard substantially defeating the
legislative purpose and policy behind the enactment of section 103.
Moreover, the case confuses the application of section 103 and detri-
mentally affects patent procurement and litigation. For these reasons,
Black Rock should be disapproved by the Supreme Court, and lower
courts should adhere to the Trilogy rationale despite its conflict with
Black Rock. The statutory standard is properly a purely relative stan-
dard dependent upon factual inquiries. Therefore, the factual inquires
announced in Graham should be viewed as mandatory.
WILLIAM F. DEMAREST, JR.
188 This will result in limiting the extent of the use of the device and its benefits,
while increasing the cost of the benefits to the few who can obtain them.
139
 1 Patent Law Perspectives, 1969-70 Annual Review { A.1[I][A.1[1]-52].
140 Id, { A.1[1][A.1[11-6].
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